TRADE PARTNERSHIP
WORLDWIDE, LLC
Responses
to Comments on CITAC STF Study
The steel industry's campaign to discredit our recent study
for the Consuming
Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC) Steel Task Force
is simply without foundation. For the most part, the accusations
leveled by the domestic steel producers do not even address the
substance of the study.
Other complaints result from erroneous interpretation of the study.
The CITAC study is built on solid data and analysis. It shows
that thousand of jobs in the United States were lost in steel
consuming industries due to price increases caused partly by the
imposition of tariffs, and partly by other factors like restructuring
within the steel industry.
We respond here to the few comments made to date that address
the substance of the study. First, steel industry representatives
charge that our data show actual steel-consuming jobs increasing
from January 2002 to December 2002. The flaw with that interpretation
is that, as we note in the study, the employment data cited are
not adjusted for seasonal variations (but important note: seasonal
variations are taken into account in the regression equations).
Thus, it is quite improper to compare January 2002 employment
data to December 2002 employment data, as the domestic steel industry
critics did. Instead, one must compare year on year data, such
as December 2001 data to December 2002 data. This comparison shows
clearly that in fact employment in steel-consuming industries
declined in the year ending in December 2002.
The Labor Department released February 10 its latest updated
employment data. According to final data for November and December
2002, actual employment in steel consuming industries declined
from December 2001 to December 2002 by 370,600 jobs. Our conclusion
remains that as many as 200,000 people were added to the unemployment
rolls over this period as a result of higher steel costs.
The domestic steel lobby also claims that Dr. Gary Hufbauer,
of the Institute for International Economics, believes our findings
are "way out of bounds," citing a Financial Times
story. After further review of the CITAC study, Dr. Hufbauer and
his colleague Ben Goodrich issued a statement clarifying their
views and authorized its placement on the CITAC web site1.
Dr. Hufbauer and Mr. Goodrich note that the job loss estimate
attributed to Dr. Hufbauer by the Financial Times "is
not our central estimate."2 They
further offer that it is likely that steel tariffs alone caused the loss of 26,000
jobs in the narrowly-defined steel-consuming sector
(we estimated that increased steel costs - resulting from tariffs
as well as other factors forced 50,000 of these workers
onto unemployment rolls). When Dr. Hufbauer and Mr. Goodrich convert
our estimate for the impact of total steel costs (50,000) to an
estimate of costs for steel tariffs alone based on research they
recently completed3, the result is
19,500 jobs4 so our results
are all reasonably consistent with each other. Thus, Dr. Hufbauer's
comments to the Financial Times, focused as they were on
the impact of tariffs alone on the narrowly-defined steel-consuming
group, do not undermine the central conclusion of the study. Rather,
they follow from a confusion of overall price effects with tariff-based
price effects, and from different definitions of steel consuming
industries. To reiterate, when one combines the recent IIE research
results steel tariff impacts with the CITAC study's estimates
for the narrower definition of steel consumers, the result is
a job estimate lower than Dr. Hufbauer's own estimate, i.e. 19,500
(of our total estimate of 50,000) are directly attributable to
tariffs in our narrowly-defined steel sector. The same approach
with our broader-based estimates implies that 78,000 job losses
of our total estimate of 200,000 job losses are directly attributable
to tariffs. In our view, there is a rough consistency across the
various estimates.
Other unfounded claims from steel industry representatives include
the accusation that the study ignored exchange rate changes and
international steel prices. Actually, our variable for the general
manufacturing economy should pick up the impact of both factors
on steel consuming industry employment. The study includes extensive
discussion of the adverse effects of international steel prices
on steel consuming industries. An objective reading of the report
indicates that the study "obfuscates" nothing.
Our critics also charge that it was improper for us to use December
2001 as a base month because it was a month of low steel prices.
On the contrary, we chose that month as the base specifically
because it was the closest month to the beginning of the disruption
of steel costs in 2002. In other words, that is the most recent
month in which employment was not affected by the factors that
gave rise to the higher steel costs. As we show in the study,
the effects of the tariffs and steel shortages caused by domestic
plant shutdowns began to force up steel prices in the early months
of 2002, well before the President imposed the steel tariffs in
March. Objective readers of the study will also note this point.
Critics claim that steel consumers obviously bore no ill effects
from higher steel costs because the prices of their end products
continued to decline as steel costs increased. This makes no sense,
since rising input costs and declining prices by definition imply
a squeeze on profits. As we carefully explain in the study, steel
consumers, most of whom are small businesses with little market
power over the price of the products they sell, had only a few
choices once steel costs started to escalate and their customers
refused to accept higher end-product prices. First, steel-consuming
manufacturers could absorb higher steel costs out of profits.
Second, manufacturers could cut costs by reducing payrolls through
layoffs. Third, they could move production outside the United
States, where they could get steel at world competitive prices,
but reduce employment in the United States. Or fourth, they could
cease U.S. operations and lay off workers. A fifth choice, that
of increasing productivity, could not be implemented effectively
by most businesses in the short run. Declining prices and employment
for steel-containing products demonstrate that manufacturers chose
to eat -into profits, cut costs and cease operations and lay off
workers.
Domestic steel industry representatives have presented no meaningful
technical criticisms of the study's regression-based approach.
They cannot really challenge this approach because they themselves
have used studies based on such techniques during the debate preceding
the President's tariff decision.5
Instead, they charge that we used a "bad structural model"
that found a relationship between prices and unemployment. In
response, we simply note that the steel industry apparently believes
that steel costs can soar with no ill effects. This simply defies
logic: someone has to pay. In this case, steel consuming industries
and their workers paid for the pain of price increases. Real people
sat on unemployment rolls in 2002 as a result. Additionally, our
estimates are consistent with other estimates of likely effects6.
A recent article published by the Wharton Business School in Knowledge@Wharton
cites several professors who confirm the cost-price squeeze facing
steel consumers and the resulting "traditional pattern of
tariff regimes:" one sector gains, another certainly pays.
Finally, steel industry representatives have not presented any
counter estimates that they think are better than those now circulating:
If they believe that some other number of steel consuming industry
workers (however the sector is defined) are unemployed because
of higher steel costs (including the effect of tariffs), then
what is a better number? Nor have domestic steel producers given
any support to their apparent claim that no job losses result
(the "free lunch" theory of trade protection). Without
a credible alternative, the CITAC Foundation study remains as
the only analysis that estimates the employment effects of the
steel price increases in 2002. We welcome the opportunity to discuss
alternatives, when and if they become available.