 |
Home
|
 |
TRADE PARTNERSHIP WORLDWIDE, LLC
Estimated Economic Effects of Proposed Import Relief Remedies for Steel
Executive Summary
As part of the Section 201 Investigation on steel imports initiated by
the Bush Administration, each of the six U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) Commissioners recommended on December 7, 2001 that the President
impose a range of tariffs and quotas on steel imports into the United
States. The covered imports amount to approximately 74 percent of total
volume of steel imports. Steel-consuming industries have predicted that
the recommended tariffs and quotas would force many of them out of business
and others to lay off manufacturing and other workers in an economy that
can ill-afford more job losses. They predict recommended remedies would
result in more harm than benefit to the economy.
At the request of The Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC),
Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC analyzed the potential impact of the
ITC recommendations on steel-producing, steel-consuming and other sectors
of the U.S. economy. The study estimated the effects of two scenarios:
imposition of weighted average tariff recommendations for all products
of 9.2 percent on imports other than Canada and Mexico of the products
on which the ITC found injury (low tariff scenario), and imposition of
average tariffs, weighted by the value of imports, of 20.7 percent on
those imports (high tariff scenario).
The results are as follows:
- Steel-consuming workers have every reason to be concerned about their
future. Higher costs of steel inputs and greater competition from imports
of steel-containing products resulting from the proposed remedies would
lead to a loss (across all sectors in the United States) of between
36,200 jobs (low tariff scenario) and 74,500 jobs (high tariff scenario).
Losses of steel-consuming sector jobs would range from 15,300 to 30,600.
- Under either scenario, eight jobs would be lost for every steel job
protected.
- Every state loses out under the proposed remedy recommendations, including
states in the "Steel Belt."
- As draconian as these remedy recommendations are, they would not restore
the U.S. steel industry to profitability. Despite the large drops in
imports from the tariff increases, the tariff restrictions affect the
volume of domestic production to a much greater extent than price. Under
the low tariff scenario, domestic steel prices would rise just 0.2 percent
as volume of output increases 2.9 percent; under the high-tariff scenario,
domestic steel prices would increase 0.4 percent and volume of output,
5.9 percent.
1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NW o WASHINGTON, DC o 20036202-347-1041
o 202-628-0669 (FAX)
- The remedy recommendations would not help steel workers very much
either. The proposed remedies would protect between 4,375 steel jobs
(low tariff scenario) and 8,900 steel jobs (high tariff scenario), at
a cost to American consumers every year of $439,485 to $451,509 per
steel job protected.
- The proposed remedies would slash imports. Import volumes would decline
by 18.5 percent under the low tariff scenario and by 35.9 percent under
the high-tariff scenario. Import prices would increase by 9.1 percent
to 20.6 percent, respectively.
- Higher prices and other inefficiencies imposed by the proposed remedies
would force consumers to pay between $1.9 billion and $4.0 billion a
year, and decrease U.S. national income by $500 million to $1.4 billion
a year at a time when policy makers are looking for every way possible
to boost national income growth.
- Steel-consuming industries would face greater competition from foreign
producers, as foreign producers have access to more competitively-priced
steel inputs than U.S. steel consumers. The high tariffs imposed on
steel imports would raise the price of these inputs for U.S. steel consumers
but would not raise prices for foreign producers of steel-containing
products. As a result, imports of finished steel products, like electric
motors, construction materials, appliances and autos, would increase.
About the Model
Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC employed a state-of-the-art computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the potential impacts of the
proposed remedies on the U.S. economy generally, and the steel industry
and steel-consuming industries specifically. CGE models are the tools
of choice for assessment of the economic impact of regional and multilateral
trade agreements. They allow for the assessment of the effects on broad
sectors of the economy of protecting one sector, including interactions
between sectors that may result.
- The model we used, based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP),
reflects the interactions across the entire U.S. economy, rather than
just within the protected industry (i.e. steel) and its immediate customers.
The linkages between sectors are both direct (like the input of steel
in the production of automobiles) and indirect (like the use of mining
inputs into steel, which feed indirectly into automobiles, and the use
of both energy services and steel in the production of automobiles).
The model contains 15 specific sectors: food; other primary goods; mining;
steel; non-ferrous metals; fabricated metals; chemicals, rubber and
plastics; refineries; automobiles and parts; other transport equipment;
electrical equipment; non-electrical equipment; other manufactures;
construction; and services. Trade Partnership Worldwide benchmarked
the model's data for national income, trade flows and related data to
the year 2000. In modeling the impact of the proposed remedies, we take
into account the current economic climate. Hence, the model includes
job creation and destruction (i.e. unemployment) as potential gaps are
created between labor earnings and the value of labor output across
sectors. Throughout, we assume that Canada and Mexico are left off of
the remedy list. Total effects across states are based on detailed BLS
data on state level employment, combined with estimated effects at the
national level.
- Basic national income data came from the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) data set, updated to the most recent full year, and supplemented
with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the International Monetary Fund, and the American Iron and
Steel Institute.
- For example, this means we explicitly model the release of worker
from the fabricated metals industry as input costs are driven up.
|
 |
 |