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Written Testimony Submitted by
CITAC Steel Task Force
to the
Trade Subcommittee of the U.S. House Ways And Means Committee
For Inclusion in the Record of the March 26, 2003 Hearing
The Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition Steel
Task Force (CITAC STF)
is a coalition of companies and associations - many of them small businesses
- that rely on open channels of trade to be competitive in their U.S.
manufacturing, transportation, construction, retailing, energy production
and other activities. CITAC STF commends the Subcommittee for conducting
this hearing and for finally allowing steel consuming industries to
be heard concerning the impact of the steel 201 remedies on our businesses
and workers.
CITAC STF also commends the Ways and Means Committee
for requesting that the ITC initiate a Section 332 investigation to
institute a fact-finding investigation of the current competitive conditions
facing the steel consuming industries in the United States with respect
to the steel safeguards measures and to foreign competitors not subject
to such measures. This investigation is critically important to steel
consumers. The steel safeguard remedies have had a profound and negative
effect on steel consumers since their imposition in March 2002. Steel-using
manufacturers have lost numerous orders and many thousands of jobs to
offshore competitors. These unintended effects are clearly relevant
in the President's determination whether the safeguard remedies should
last another 18 months at further cost to steel consuming industries.
The Mid-Point Review provides the opportunity for a full analysis. The
332 study, which will be presented to the President in the same document
as the mid-point review report, must provide that information.
Since the hearing on March 26, 2003, the International
Trade Commission (ITC) has formally initiated the 332 investigation
on the impact of the steel remedies on steel consumers. CITAC STF urges
the Committee to assure that the 332 investigation and the Mid-Point
Review of the safeguard remedies are integrated and complement each
other, as was the Committee's intention.
The Safeguard Measures Should Be Terminated
as Soon as Possible
CITAC STF's top priority is the termination of the steel
safeguard measures because they are wreaking havoc in the markets for
downstream steel-using manufacturers. Skyrocketing prices, uncertain
supply due to allocations and lengthening lead-times, broken contracts
and growing quality problems are forcing many steel users to the brink
of disaster. These unintended consequences are not only disastrous for
steel users but for steel producers as well. We hope that the Bush Administration
will act to end this destructive tax on American steel-using industries
as soon as possible.
At the March 26 hearing, several steel producer witnesses
suggested that the steel industry's survival is essential in this time
of war. While we agree that it is in everyone's interests to have a
strong U.S. steel industry, any concerns about defense are misplaced.
The Defense Department's usage of domestic steel only amounts to 0.3%
of domestic steel delivery and the Department of Defense generally does
not buy imported steel. The steel safeguard measures are completely
irrelevant to national defense.
The tariffs should be ended at the Mid-Point Review for
the following reasons:
-
The tariffs are doing far more harm to steel consumers
than any benefit to steel producers could justify.
-
The economic downturn since March 2002 has vastly
magnified the injury to steel using manufacturers.
-
Price increases during 2002, which have abated only
moderately in 2003, are far beyond any predicted level of price increases.
These prices have seriously damaged the international competitiveness
of American manufacturers that use steel.
-
The steel safeguards threaten trading relationships.
When the WTO case is over this fall, a loss in the WTO could result
in retaliation against exports of U.S. products of $1 billion or more.
-
The safeguards can do no more than they have already
done to realize the goal for which they were imposed - the rationalization,
restructuring and consolidation of non-competitive U.S. steel capacity.
-
The safeguards do not address the root causes of
the steel industry's problems, which is the non-competitiveness of
certain integrated producers due to relatively high costs and operating
inefficiencies.
-
The safeguards interrupt critical steel imports that
are absolutely essential, since we must depend on imports to supply
20 to 25 percent of our domestic demand. Exclusions have not permitted
sufficient quantities of the steel American manufacturers need.
More Jobs Have Been Lost From The Tariffs Than Have Been
"Saved"
A particularly onerous consequence of the tariffs is the threat to
U.S. jobs - many of which are union jobs - in steel-consuming sectors.
Steel-using jobs vastly outnumber steel-producing jobs in every state.
Nationally, the ratio is 59 to 1. Already, jobs are being lost as business
leaves the country. As the damage mounts, studies show that eight steel-using
jobs will be lost for every steel-producing job "saved," even in the
short run. We believe that steel-using jobs are no less important than
steel-producing jobs. A recent economic analysis
published by the CITAC Foundation, Inc. concluded that about 200,000
jobs were lost in steel consuming industries due to higher prices. The
steel safeguard measures caused the price increases in large part.
The CITAC Foundation study evaluated job effects in steel
consuming industries both narrowly and broadly defined. In the steel
consuming industries, narrowly defined, about 50,000 jobs were lost
in 2002 from higher steel prices. In steel consuming industries, broadly
defined, some 200,000 jobs were lost in 2002. The CITAC study's numbers
indicate that serious damage was done to downstream industries from
steel price increases and the safeguard tariffs. 1
Between 1995 and 2001, steel-using manufacturers added
1,255,000 new jobs to the economy, according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (while jobs in the manufacturing sector as a whole actually
declined by 829,000). Today, steel-using manufacturing employ nearly
13 million Americans, compared to less than 200,000 jobs in steel-production.
Many steel users are small businesses, which have been and remain the
engine of growth for the American economy. Steel-using industries provide
good jobs and are invaluable contributors to their communities. Furthermore,
the steel safeguards have had a ripple effect. As U.S. steel-consuming
industries suffer, so do the companies that supply those industries,
such as service centers, finishers, platers, assemblers and port workers.
We urge the Committee to find policy options that assist industries
throughout the economy, rather than imposing tariffs, which only transfer
pain from producing to consuming industries.
The Steel Safeguards Have Made U.S. Steel Consumers
Uncompetitive
Steel consumers are in trouble because of price hikes
and other dislocations in the U.S. that have resulted in a severe competitive
disadvantage for steel consumers compared to their overseas competitors.
While some of these price increases have moderated in the last few months,
as indicated on the attached chart, the United States remains at the
high end of the world's steel price markets. As a result, U.S. manufacturers
that use steel are operating under a competitive disadvantage compared
with their foreign counterparts. It is not important to compare prices
to the levels in the past; it is important to compare U.S. prices to
overseas prices to competitors.
Accurate international pricing data is a key component
of sound policy making. Unfortunately, data in this area is very incomplete.
For example, a chart published by the American Iron and Steel Institute
in January provided an incomplete and misleading picture of the situation
faced by steel consumers in the United States. The AISI chart was misleading
in the following respects:
-
AISI only posted prices for hot-rolled steel
and excluded cold-rolled and galvanized steel - the latter products
are more important to steel consumers than hot-rolled. When all three
flat-rolled products are included in the calculations, and countries
such as Russia and Japan are added (Russia, for example, is the world's
largest steel exporter, although trade restrictions keep much Russian
steel from the U.S. market), the U.S. is shown to have higher prices
than in most markets.
-
AISI failed to note that prices in most world
markets are stated in "C&F" or "delivered" terms, while U.S. prices
are listed in "FOB mill" terms. This means that world market prices
are based on the steel cost plus freight charges, while the U.S. prices
are based on the price of steel at the factory gate, with no freight
charges added in. AISI, in making a comparison using the FOB mill
prices for the U.S., therefore understates U.S. prices.
The attached CITAC STF information corrects these problems
and gives a more accurate picture of global market prices. The price
differential between steel in the U.S. and foreign markets has led to
a dramatic increase of imports of value-added products made from steel,
as well as shifts in production of these value-added products offshore.
These production shifts have occurred very rapidly in response to the
steel safeguards. As Timothy Taylor
testified before this Subcommittee, in our globally competitive economy,
production changes happen far more rapidly than they did 30 years ago.
Thus, if the tariffs remain in effect for another year and a half, even
more U.S. steel-consuming jobs will be lost. Once these jobs are lost,
they are lost forever. 2
In recent Senate Steel Caucus testimony, steel producers
repeated their refrain about pricing. It is important to note that their
attempts to rebut the hard evidence of competitive disadvantage for
steel consumers are entirely wrong. For example:
Price "Restoration" Is Not a Measure of Success
U.S. steel producers have persistently tried to portray
the damage of steel tariffs to steel-using manufacturers as either non-existent
or a "payback" for "unsustainably" low steel prices in the past.
The underlying premise of the steel producers' argument
is that higher steel prices somehow help steel consumers, and that,
in any event, the dramatic steel price increases currently being visited
on steel users are somehow justifiable because prices are only at or
below their 20/22 year "historical averages." CITAC STF rejects the
notion that the "fairness" of prices should be measured by their 20-
or 22-year averages. This is an obviously meaningless benchmark. Televisions,
computers cars, auto parts and many other products have been declining
in price for years. Productivity improvements and technological innovation
enable companies in many industries to reduce costs and, in competitive
markets, end product prices. Steel is no different from other industries
in this respect. Nor have the steel producers made any connection between
20-year average prices and "sustainable" prices.
Steel users are largely unable to pass along price increases
to their customers. Several witnesses made this point on March 26. The
squeeze of sharply rising steel prices against product prices that are
not changeable puts steel using manufacturers at risk of destruction.
The steel safeguards, imposed by our own government, have sharply aggravated
this problem.
Steel as a production input should be priced by the market.
In the United States, the price must be comparable to prices charged
in other world markets. Higher prices will damage American manufacturers
that use steel by driving business offshore. This is precisely what
is currently happening in the U.S.
The steel producer witnesses on March 26 largely ignored
the fact that the safeguards inevitably hurt their customers. They cannot
be successful by imposing punishing price increases on their own customers.
The safeguard measures therefore are doomed to fail in their goal of
making the U.S. industry internationally competitive. They are driving
steel purchasers, and steel purchasing offshore-never to return. While
some may argue that long-term decisions are not based on a three-year
tariff program, our observation is exactly the opposite. Thus, the longer
the steel safeguard measures remain in effect, the more damage will
be done to consuming industries.
Exclusions Have Not Solved the Problems of
Consuming Industries
While exclusions have benefitted some steel consumers,
the exclusion process has not solved a primary concern of small- and
medium-sized steel-consuming businesses in the U.S. - reliable and competitively
priced steel.
The exclusion process has many shortcomings. The tariffs
had an impact on all steel, both imported and domestic. Steel consumers
buying 100 percent of their steel from U.S. producers also experienced
price hikes, shortages and long lead times. Exclusions do nothing to
help these steel consumers. Also, exclusions do not benefit steel consumers
that buy steel from service centers. Finally, the process is complex
- some steel consumers cannot afford to apply for exclusions that are
at best uncertain.
Thus, the exclusion process cannot be viewed as a substitute
for resolving the challenges the steel safeguards pose for steel consumers.
Steel consumers who are continuing to suffer from prices and supply
shortages from the steel tariffs should not have to come to Washington
to buy steel.
The Safeguard Measures Have Served Their Purpose
Since the steel safeguard remedies were put into effect,
the following significant changes have occurred:
-
The U.S. steel industry has initiated significant
consolidation and restructuring.
-
The "legacy" costs of several bankrupt companies have
been reduced or eliminated.
-
The Administration has made significant progress in
its multilateral steel initiatives (especially defining subsidies).
To the extent these changes are a function of the tariffs
(a doubtful proposition, since the consolidation and restructuring were
poised to happen in any event), the tariffs have achieved a considerable
measure of success. Little purpose would be served, however, by keeping
the tariffs in place for another 18 months. Mergers and acquisitions
without plant closures are not helpful to the industry since the excess
capacity remains. To the extent that the tariffs allow uncompetitive
plants to come back on-line and produce longer, the tariffs are, in
fact, counterproductive to the long-term health of the steel industry.
Efforts to reduce the world excess capacity of non-competitive
steel production are laudable (assuming governments of the world can
define what is "excess" capacity). However, steel using manufacturers
who are struggling now for their survival should not be held hostage
to this process. The steel negotiations have proceeded to the point
where they can clearly proceed without the "stick" of the tariffs -
especially when the tariffs have caused such harm to the economy as
a whole.
Conclusion
The Section 201 steel tariffs are clearly causing far
more harm than benefit to the U.S. economy. Thousands of American small
businesses are threatened, and the threat is worsening. All available
data support this conclusion. Yet until now, there has been no government
analysis of the impact of the steel tariffs on steel consumers. We applaud
the Committee's role in initiating such a study. We now urge the Committee
to monitor the progress of the study and the statutory Mid-Point Review
of the steel safeguard measures to assure that the ITC and the President
give full consideration to the effects of this program on the entire
economy.
CITAC STF stands ready to work with the Committee toward
these ends. We thank you for the opportunity to include our views in
the record.
1. The
study used a commonly employed regression analysis to develop these
estimates of job losses. No other analysis exists of the jobs effects
of the steel safeguard measures. Clearly a government-sponsored analysis
is long overdue.
2. Obviously, the steel safeguard
measures are one of several factors affecting U.S. manufacturers. We
believe the evidence indicates that it is an important factor and one
that the U.S. government is truly able to control. It has made a bad
situation much worse and will continue doing so as long as it remains
in effect.
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